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ANY WAY YOU SLICE IT: WHY RACIAL PROFILING IS WRONG 
REGINALD T. SHUFORD* 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that in life but two things are certain: death and taxes.1  If 
you are a young African-American or Latino male, however, there is an 
additional certainty: At some point during your lifetime, you will be harassed 
by the police.2  Racially motivated police harassment, vis-a-vis racial profiling, 
is as American as baseball and apple pie.  And it has been around, in some 
form or fashion, for most of America’s history.3  Racial profiling happens to 
consumers and pedestrians, on planes, trains, and automobiles.  There is 
driving while black (or brown), flying while black, walking while black, 
shopping while black, hailing (as in a cab) while black, swimming while black 
(six African-American youths accused of stealing a cell phone and beeper at a 
public pool in Michigan) and dining while black (think Miami, where a tip was 
automatically added to the bill of a black patron, on the assumption that blacks 
are poor tippers), to name a few.  The most accurate term to describe the 
pervasiveness of the phenomenon is breathing while black, a reality 
underscored by the shooting deaths over a thirteen-month period - by the New 
 
* Staff Attorney, Legal Department, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation National 
Headquarters, New York.  I thank my ACLU colleagues around the country for their trailblazing 
and inspiring work challenging racial profiling.  I also want to thank my colleagues in my office 
in New York for their enthusiastic support of my own work seeking an end to racial profiling. 
 1. Benjamin Franklin, JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A 
COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT 
AND MODERN LITERATURE (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). 
 2. See KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, 
BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARRASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 34 (1998) 
“The frequency of contact between Black men and the police has led a generation of Black men 
to teach their sons ‘The Lesson’ – instructions on how to handle a police stop.”  Id. 
 3. For example, during the time of the Black Codes following the Civil War, among other 
things, Blacks were stopped during their travels, forced to identify themselves and reveal where 
they were coming from and where they were going.  See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, 
CRIME, AND THE LAW 84-85.  See also F.M. Baker, “Some Reflections on Racial Profiling,” 27 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 627 (1999) “Racial profiling is . . . a component of our national 
fabric.”  Id. 
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York Police Department alone - of four unarmed black men, Amadou Diallo, 
Patrick Dorismond, Malcolm Ferguson and Richard Watson.4 
ARGUMENT 
Any way you slice it, racial profiling is wrong.5  First, it is morally 
indefensible, steeped as it is in racial stereotypes and erroneous assumptions 
about the propensity of black and Latino men to commit particular types of 
crimes.6  Second, racial profiling - equating race with criminality and using it 
in the absence of and in lieu of probable cause - is legally impermissible.7  It 
violates various constitutional and statutory rights, including the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Finally, racial profiling is just bad, 
ineffective policing.  By targeting black and Latino men, practitioners of racial 
 
 4. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Breathing While Black, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at A29; see 
also Rocco Parascandola, Jamie Schram, Maria Malave & Tracy Connor, Unarmed Man Slain in 
Police Struggle: Giuliani Asks Calm as Cops Start Probe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2000, at A11; 
Tina Kelley, Police Shooting Victim Is Remembered and Mourned in Tears and Songs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at B4. 
 5. See Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp.2d 780, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 
“Racial profiling of any kind is anathema to our criminal justice system because it eviscerates the 
core integrity that is necessary to operate that system effectively in our diverse democracy.”  Id. 
 6. Racial profiling has flourished in the era of the War on Drugs.  See generally Driving 
While Black: Racial Profiling on our Nation’s Highways, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
SPECIAL REPORT, May 1999, available at http:www.aclu.org/profiling/rport/index.html.  Where 
abusive and excessive police practices were once conducted on the sly, the War on Drugs has 
virtually sanctioned the public, systematic, and unapologetic violation of civil liberties. Add to 
this a society still struggling with stereotypes involving race and crime, and the inevitable result is 
that people of color are those bearing the brunt of these abusive practices. But see ELLIS COSE, 
THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 107 (1993) (asserting that history teaches that racism and 
stereotypes preceded a black underclass who commit a disproportionate amount of crime, thereby 
undermining the argument that race-based law enforcement is merely a reaction to that reality). 
 7. For the first time, in 1999, the term “racial profiling” made its way into the dictionary.  
The OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE defines “racial profiling” as the 
“[a]lleged police policy of stopping and searching vehicles driven by people from particular racial 
groups.” With appropriate respect, this author disagrees with this definition, because, as discussed 
above, racial profiling occurs in non-vehicular contexts as well.  The OXFORD AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY’s definition of “racial profiling” is a more appropriate definition for  “driving while 
black” or “d.w.b.,” which also made the dictionary for the first time in 1999.  RANDOM HOUSE 
WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY defines “d.w.b.” as: “Driving While Black (used ironically to 
refer to the stoppage of a black motorist by police because of the motorist’s race rather than for 
any real offense).” 
  Other commentators also have offered a definition of “racial profiling.”  For example, 
Harvard Law School Professor Randall Kennedy urges a broad definition of racial profiling, 
consistent with present-day police practices: “using race as a factor [not the sole factor] in 
deciding whom to place under suspicion and/or surveillance.”  Randall Kennedy, Suspect, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13 & 20, 1999, at 35 (emphasis added). 
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profiling ignore the reality that others are committing crimes (especially those 
involving the transport of drugs on the nation’s highways) and are largely 
being allowed to get away with it. Additionally, the societal costs exacted by 
racial profiling, including jury nullification and the lack of faith in the justice 
system, are immeasurable. 
DISCUSSION 
The Immorality of Racial Profiling 
Racial profiling is morally indefensible.  Under the guise of good policing, 
racial profilers stereotype and penalize African-Americans and Latinos solely 
on the basis of their skin color.8  Even conceding that, as with all races, some 
small percentage of African-Americans and Latinos are committing crimes, 
racially motivated policing punishes everyone for the sins of a few.9  So 
widespread is racial profiling that Harvard Law School Professor Randall 
Kennedy, in his book Race, Crime, and the Law, likens it to a tax levied 
against black men: “[A] young black man selected for questioning by police as 
he alights from an airplane or drives a car is being made to pay a type of racial 
tax for the war against drugs that whites and other groups escape.”10 
In attempting to justify racial profiling, its proponents frequently demonize 
people of color, often employing hateful and vitriolic rhetoric.  Last year, for 
example, New Jersey State Police Superintendent Carl Williams said to a 
newspaper that “mostly minorities” traffic in marijuana and cocaine and that 
“[t]he president of the United States went to Mexico to talk to the president of 
Mexico about drugs.  He didn’t go to Ireland.  He didn’t go to England.”11  
Fortunately for motorists of color traveling the roads of  New Jersey, he was 
fired soon thereafter.12 
In another example, white separatist Jared Taylor told an annual meeting 
of the National Association of Police Organizations that law-enforcement 
officers were justified in using racial profiling during police traffic stops.13  
 
 8. Many consider the case of Wen Ho Lee, the Chinese scientist accused and incarcerated 
for spying, as an example of racial profiling indicating that Asian-Americans are victims of the 
practice as well. 
 9. See COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVLEDGED CLASS, supra note 6, at 94-95 (pointing out that, 
in the context of violent crimes, blacks who are arrested made up less that 1 percent of the black 
population in 1991, and just under 1.7% of the black male population). 
 10. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 159. 
 11. Joe Donohoe, Trooper Boss: Race Plays Role in Drug Crimes, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 
Feb. 28, 1999. 
 12. Corky Siemaszko, N.J. Top Cop Axed for Race Remarks, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1, 
1999. 
 13. See ACLU Newswire: White Separatist Defends Racial Profiling At Police Meeting, 
Aug. 20, 1999, available at http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/w082099a.html. 
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Taylor, who has called diversity “unnatural” and said on his Web site that 
whites face “the prospect of oblivion,” said that profiling was “common sense” 
because blacks commit violent crimes more than whites.14  Likewise, Marshall 
Frank, a retired police officer defended racial profiling by resorting to racist 
and inaccurate assumptions about the make of cars people drove, the type of 
clothes they wore, and the neighborhoods they visited.15  In the editorial, 
Frank, referring to people as “dirt-bags,” said, “Label me a racist if you 
wish.”16  He displayed no concern whatever about condemnation for his racist 
beliefs.  One can only imagine the lessons he passed on to the officers in his 
charge during his thirty years as an officer.  Even more frightening is the 
untold number of motorists who likely fell victim to his shameless beliefs.  
Those sentiments, thankfully, are at great odds with what most Americans 
believe today.17 
Another factor illustrating the morally shallow ground upon which racial 
profiling rests is the all-too-common failure of its proponents seriously to 
appreciate or care about the deleterious effects racial profiling has on its 
victims.  Motorists penalized for driving while black or brown will, at the very 
least, be inconvenienced.  Frequently, the experience will be frightening, 
humiliating or even traumatic. Sometimes, the episode will be deadly.18  The 
shooting of three African-American and Latino youths on the New Jersey 
Turnpike by New Jersey State Troopers in 1998 demonstrates that the lives of 
young black and Latino men mean little or nothing to officers who have sworn 
an oath to protect everyone.19  Yet, the Marshall Franks of the world justify 
racial profiling on the ground that it is “better to be safe than sorry.”  Such 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Marshall Frank, Otherviews, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 19, 1999 (op/ed.). 
 16. Id. 
 17. In a Gallup poll, the general public indicated its overwhelming disapproval of the 
practice of racial profiling.  According to the poll, 59 percent of all Americans,  56 percent of 
white Americans, and 77 percent of African-Americans said that racial profiling is widespread.  
Moreover, 81 percent of all Americans disapprove of racial profiling. Over 40 percent of African-
Americans say they have been the victims of racial profiling, including 72 percent of African-
American men aged 18-34.  Unsurprisingly, African-Americans are more likely to have a 
negative view of police than their white counterparts.  See Frank Newport, Racial Profiling is 
Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young Black Men, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 9, 
1999, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr991209.asp.  Demonstrating the extent 
to which racial profiling has become a part of daily discourse, even “Dear Abby” repudiated the 
practice.  See Abigail Van Buren, Dear Abby, NEWSDAY, Apr. 10, 2000, at B14, available at 
http://www.newsday.com/coverage/current/fanfare/Monday/nd1067.htm. 
 18. Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond in New York, Jonny Gammage in Pennsylvania, 
and Tyisha Miller in California, presumed dangerous before being gunned down, all died from 
racial profiling. 
 19. See Peter Noel, Fear and Loathing on the New Jersey Turnpike, THE VILLAGE VOICE, 
June 4, 1998. 
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callous disregard for the safety and well-being of profiling victims begs an 
obvious question: safer for whom? 
The Illegality of Racial Profiling 
Beyond being immoral, racial profiling is also illegal.20  The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids unequal treatment on 
the basis of race.21  “The central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.”22  
The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons 
similarly situated should be treated alike.”23  Racial profiling, which targets 
people of color on the basis of nothing more than their race and subjects them 
to differential treatment, stands in direct contravention of  the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s mandates. 
There are several ways for a plaintiff to plead intentional race 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause: a plaintiff could 
point to a law or policy that expressly classifies persons on the basis of race;24 
 
 20. Race as the sole factor in law enforcement activity is impermissible.  See, e.g. United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (prohibiting use of Mexican ancestry as basis for 
Terry stop); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997) (Equal Protection clause is 
violated when a police officer initially targets someone solely on basis of race, without additional 
factors, and then, because of the person’s race, investigates that person for drug trafficking.); 
Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 991 F.Supp. 895, 901-02 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997) (“There can be no question that a seizure based solely on race or ethnicity can never 
be reasonable.”); Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F.Supp. 487, 499 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (“[A] search or 
seizure will never be considered reasonable if the officer stops the vehicle solely because of the 
mexican ancestry of the occupant.”) (emphases in original); United States v. Ramos, 753 F.Supp. 
75, 78-80 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (Hispanic appearance insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to 
justify a stop.); Ramirez v. Webb, 599 F.Supp. 1278, 1283 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (A seizure can 
never be reasonable if the stop was based solely on person’s Mexican ancestry.).  However, the 
use of race as one of several factors is not proscribed.  See e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873; 
Avery, 137 F.3d 343.  But see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6494 
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Border Patrol may not rely on Hispanic ancestry as a factor in 
making stops and overruling prior cases in which Hispanic appearance was permitted to serve as a 
basis for stops, absent particularized or individualized suspicion). 
 21. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 
1. 
 22. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 216 (1995) (quoting Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1953); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). 
Accord McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Lowery v. Commonwealth of Virginia 
388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Va. App. 1990).  See also Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 932 (5th 
Cir. 1991).  “The heart of the equal protection clause is its prohibition of discriminatory 
treatment.  If a governmental actor has imposed unequal burdens based upon race, it has violated 
the clause.”  Id. 
 23. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 24. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227-229. 
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a plaintiff could identify a facially neutral policy that has been applied in an 
intentionally discriminatory manner;25 or a plaintiff could allege that a facially 
neutral statute or policy has an adverse effect and that it was motivated by 
discriminatory animus.26  Racial profiling cases are likely to contain 
allegations of an express racial classification.27 
Racial profiling also violates the Fourth Amendment, which is designed to 
protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.28  In the context 
of vehicular stops, an investigative stop of an automobile “must be justified by 
some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, 
engaged in criminal activity.”29  In other words, some level of reasonable 
suspicion is required. The law enforcement officer conducting the stop must be 
able to “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant” stopping a person to 
conduct further investigation.30  For automobile searches, while a warrant is 
not required, probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband is still 
a prerequisite.31  “Probable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found.’”32  In the absence of probable cause, a 
search warrant, or exigent circumstances, a search will be deemed legal only if 
it is conducted with the consent of the party searched.33 
 
 25. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). 
 26. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65; see generally Brown v. Oneonta, 195 
F.3d 111, 118-119 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 27. See, e.g., Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches, et al. v. Maryland Dep’t of 
State Police, et al., 72 F.Supp.2d 560, 568-69 (D.Md. 1999); Chavez v. Illinois, 27 F.Supp.2d 
1053, 1070 (N.D.Ill. 1998); Gerald v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Public Serv., CIV-99-676-R (W.D. 
Okla. Dec. 21, 1999) (slip op. at 21) (on file with the author); National Congress for Puerto Rican 
Rights v. City of New York, et al., 191 F.R.D. 52, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 28. The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”  U. S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 29. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); accord Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 
1237 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 30. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 31. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); accord Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
659 (1979) (Detention of a motorist is reasonable where probable cause exists to believe that a 
traffic violation has occurred).  Unfortunately, protections accorded motorists are not always 
extensive.  See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (granting police broad authority to 
search driver and passengers, vehicle, compartments and containers, incident to lawful custodial 
arrest); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is “free to go” before his consent to 
search will be recognized as voluntary). 
 32. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
238 (1983)). 
 33. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983).  The government has the “burden of 
proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a 
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Depending upon the nature and severity of the encounter, allegations 
generally will be that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping a 
motorist of color without reasonable suspicion, searching him and his vehicle 
without probable cause, detaining him for unreasonably long periods of time, 
coercing consent to search or searching without consent, and deploying a drug-
sniffing dog for an intrusive and unjustified search.34 
Claims also may exist under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
its implementing regulations, which prohibit discrimination by agencies 
receiving federal funding.35  Significantly, while Title VI itself bars only 
intentional discrimination, its implementing regulations also prohibit practices 
that have an unjustified disparate impact.36 
Although claims based upon the constitutional right to travel have yet to 
meet with much success in racial profiling cases,37 under the right 
circumstances, a racial profiling litigant may prevail.38 Moreover, depending 
upon the factual circumstances surrounding the profiling incident, various 
torts, including false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional or 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, also may be alleged, as well as 
conspiracy and state statutory claims.39 
 
burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”  Id.  See 
also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1973). 
 34. See, e.g., Maryland State Conference, 72 F.Supp.2d at 560. 
 35. Title VI provides: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
42 U.S.C. §2000d.  Department of Justice implementing regulations provide that no funding 
recipient shall: 
utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting 
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the 
effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the 
program as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin. 
28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2). 
 36. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Guardian Ass’n v. Civil Service 
Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 607-08, 612, 634 (1983); Rodriguez v. California 
Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp.2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 37. E.g., Maryland State Conference, 72 F.Supp.2d at 568-69; Chavez, 27 F.Supp.2d at 1070 
(N.D.Ill. 1998); Gerald, CIV-99-676-R, slip op. at 21. 
 38. See generally Maryland State Conference, 72 F.Supp.2d at 568-69.  Concluding that the 
plaintiffs’ assertion that they continued to use Maryland’s highways indicated the absence of an 
“actual barrier,” the court held that “more” of an impediment than the stops alleged by plaintiffs 
was required to establish a constitutional violation. Id.  In some circumstances, therefore, it is 
conceivable that “more” can be shown and a right to travel violation accordingly established. 
 39. See, e.g., Complaint, Rodriguez, 89 F. Supp.2d 1131, No. C-99-20895-JF/EAI (Nov. 30, 
1999) (on file with author).  See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986. 
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The Inefficiency of Racial Profiling 
In addition to being immoral and illegal, racial profiling is bad policing, 
failing to reduce crime - some say even breeding it - and exacting 
immeasurable costs upon society.  Time and again, studies have shown that 
racial profiling, to combat crime generally and in service of the War on Drugs, 
in particular, is simply ineffective.  For example, federal statistics show that 
African-Americans are 13 percent of the country’s drug users (equivalent to 
their composition in the American population), yet African-Americans 
constitute 37 percent of those arrested on drug charges, 55 percent of those 
convicted on drug charges, and 74 percent of all drug offenders sentenced to 
prison.40  The former Attorney General of New Jersey has called this 
phenomenon the “perverse illogic” of racial profiling: when people of color are 
targeted and searched at a grossly disproportionate rate, it is only logical that 
they will be arrested and incarcerated at a commensurately high rate.41  
Meanwhile, the 87 percent of drug users who are NOT African-American are 
for the most part left alone. 
In Maryland, statistics by the Maryland State Police show that black and 
white motorists were found to have drugs at an equal rate of 28 percent,42 and 
that blacks were 73 percent of those stopped and searched, despite being only 
17.5 percent of those committing traffic violations.43 
 
 40. See Troy Duster, Pattern, Purpose, and Race in the Army War, in CRACK IN AMERICA 
262-68 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997).  Accord 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATUSTICS (U.S. Department of Justice and State University of New York at 
Albany); RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 31 (Despite being 38 percent of all crack users, blacks 
account for more than 85 percent of federal crack convictions.)  See also Jennifer Loven, Black 
Women Stopped Disproportionately By Customs, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 10, 2000, 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/travel/DailyNews/blackwomen000410.html 
(indicating that while black women passing through U.S. Customs as they return home from 
overseas trips are more likely to be subjected to strip searches and X-rays, they are the least likely 
to be carrying drugs). 
 41. Final Report of the State Police Review Team, July 2, 1999, available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/Rpt_ii.pdf.  Accord Martinez, 92 F. Supp.2d at 783.  “[T]argeting 
Blacks for police surveillance results in higher rates of arrest, reinforcing the presumption of 
Black criminality.  If police stopped and frisked whites as frequently as they do Blacks, white 
arrest rates would increase.”  Id. (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and 
the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 
(1999)).  “Put simply, there is a connection between where police look for contraband and where 
they find it.”  Id. (quoting David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law: Why 
“Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 301 (1999)). 
 42. This number seems extremely high and is probably being overstated by the Maryland 
State Police in an attempt to show the effectiveness of its tactics.  Its significance, however, is 
obvious: it is the same across races. 
 43.  Driving While Black, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 
6, at 32.  
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Not only does racial profiling fail miserably in an arguably well-
intentioned but poorly executed effort to rid America of drugs, its societal costs 
are extraordinary.44  For one thing, people of color “individually and as a 
community are psychologically harmed.”45  The costs to society also include 
the perpetuation of inaccurate stereotypes, which in turn produces 
“exaggerated levels of fear and more pronounced levels of scapegoating.”46  
Fundamentally, 
[r]ace-based policies pit law enforcement against minorities and create an 
unbreakable cycle: racial stereotypes may motivate police to arrest Blacks 
more frequently.  This in turn generates statistically disparate arrest patterns, 
which in turn form the basis for further police selectivity by race.47 
Racial profiling also results in the refusal by some people of color to 
cooperate with police investigations, to disbelieve police officers who are 
testifying against a criminal defendant and to employ jury nullification when 
serving on juries.48  According to Professor David Cole, racially discriminatory 
law enforcement practices 
undermine law enforcement itself, because they breed resentment and 
alienation among minorities . . . .  People who see the criminal justice system 
as fundamentally unfair will be less likely to cooperate with police, to testify as 
witnesses, to serve on juries, and to convict guilty defendants when they do 
 
 44. See generally id. at 36-7. 
 45. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 44.  “The impact of police harassment is cumulative.  Each 
negative experience creates another building block in the Black folklore about police.”  Id.  
Accord Harris, supra note 40, at 268.  “Pretextual traffic stops aggravate years of accumulated 
feelings of injustice, resulting in deepening distrust and cynicism by African-Americans about 
police and the entire criminal justice system.”  Id. 
 46. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 45.  See also COSE, supra note 6, at 110.  “[A]s long as the 
dominant message sent to impressionable black boys is that they are expected to turn into savage 
criminals, nothing will stop substantial numbers of them from doing just that.”  Id. 
 47. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 45.  The costs to society also can be measured in monetary 
terms: 
U.S. taxpayers have paid tens of millions of dollars in police brutality suits.  Between 
1992 and 1993, Los Angeles County alone paid more than $30 million to citizens 
victimized by police brutality.  In 1996, an all-white Indianapolis jury held the city liable 
for the police killing of an unarmed 16-year-old Black boy.  The jury awarded $4.3 
million. 
Id.  In New York, there is a similar patter of payouts.  See Kevin Flynn, Record Payout In 
Settlements Against Police, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at B1; Michael Cooper, Stricter Oversight 
of Police Would Save Money, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, at B3.  The cases of Abner Louima and 
Amadou Diallo are likely to produce substantial settlement payouts, as well. 
 48. See id. at 46.  For a discussion of jury nullification and its various manifestations, see 
Jack Weinstein, The Many Dimensions of Jury Nullification, 81 JUDICATURE 168; see also Paul 
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE 
L.J. 677 (1995); Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury Nullification, 
32 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 285 (1999). 
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serve.  In addition, people who have lost respect for the law’s legitimacy are 
more likely to break the law themselves. . . .  Finally, the perception and reality 
of a fundamentally unfair criminal justice system contribute to broader racial 
divisions in society.49 
Even judges, finding racial profiling at play, have suppressed evidence, 
reduced sentences or refused to convict in criminal cases.50 
CONCLUSION 
Racial profiling “operate[s] like a deadly cancer on our justice system.”51  
It eats away at the very liberties which have made America the greatest country 
in the world: “the freedom to go about our business without unwarranted 
police interference and the right to be treated equally before the law, without 
regard to race or ethnicity.”52  Law enforcement agencies expend limited 
resources unsuccessfully targeting black and Latino citizens in their failed 
efforts carrying out the War on Drugs.  In so doing, racial profilers trample 
upon the civil, constitutional and human rights of people of color, most often 
without apology and increasingly with tragic consequences.  Those who are 
targeted, part of the largest growing segments of the American population, in 
turn regard police officers and the justice system, generally, with suspicion and 
skepticism.  Some go so far as to resist helping a police investigation; some 
will even nullify verdicts.  To most Americans, the Civil Rights Movement, led 
by Martin Luther King, Jr., signified a sea of change in the fight for racial 
equality.  Dr. King’s philosophy exalted nonviolence and brotherhood over 
hate and brute force and called for the equal treatment of all Americans.  Dr. 
King ‘s plea was simple: that all individuals be judged by the content of their 
character rather than the color of their skin.53  Racial profiling is 
incontrovertible evidence that we are not yet there. 
 
 
 49. Martinez, 92 F. Supp.2d at 782 (quoting David Cole, Race, Policing, and the Future of 
Criminal Law, 26 HUM. RTS. 3 (Summer 1999)). 
 50. See, e.g., U.S. v. Laymon, 730 F.Supp. 332 (D.Colo. 1990); United States v. Leviner, 31 
F.Supp.2d 23, 33 (D. Mass. 1998); State v. Soto # 88-07-492 Superior Court of New Jersey 
(L.Div. March 4, 1996, Judge Francis) (on file with author); United States v. Williams, No. CR-
93-214-A, slip op. (W.D. Okla. January 11, 1994) (on file with author). 
 51. Martinez, 92 F. Supp.2d at 783. 
 52. Driving While Black, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 
6, at 7. 
 53. See STEPHEN B. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: THE LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. 254 (1982) (“I Have A Dream” speech). 
